CONSTRUCTION DEFECT JOURNAL

"News and Information for Construction Defect and Claims Professionals"

CONSTRUCTION DEFECT JOURNAL - ISSUE 242749 - WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2025

Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys

April 28, 2014
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP

In conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”).

In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed.

Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP

Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com


Use the form below to search the CDJ Archives: Search by topic, name, keywords, etc...

CDJ ARCHIVES-NEWS YOU MIGHT HAVE MISSED